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The DACA Case: Agencies’ “Square 
Corners” and Reliance Interests in 
Immigration Law
Peter Margulies*
Stewardship has long been a trope in U.S. law and governance. The 
Framers spoke of the “trust” that the people reposed in their gov-
ernment.1 In immigration cases, the Supreme Court has on occasion 
curbed state enforcement, viewing states as too prone to “sudden irri-
tation” to adequately steward abiding national interests.2 Holding in 
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of California that 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under President 
Trump had failed to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” when it 
rescinded the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) pro-
gram, the Court refined this stewardship paradigm.3
Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the Court in Regents, noted 
that in announcing DACA, President Barack Obama’s then–DHS sec-
retary, Janet Napolitano, had provided two things of value to foreign 
nationals who came to the United States as children with no lawful 
immigration status: (1) a reprieve from deportation, called “removal” 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); and (2) eligibility 
for various benefits, including work permits.4 According to Roberts, 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate University; 
J.D., Columbia Law School.
1  See The Federalist No. 23 at 153–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961); Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed H. Shugerman, Faithful Execution and 
Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111, 2119 (2019) (discussing the Constitution’s Take Care 
Clause as forging a system of laws as a trust that the president must protect).
2  See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (citing The Federalist No. 3 
at 44 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (cited by Supreme Court in later edition)).
3  140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
4  Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. 
Aguilar et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Cust. & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012), https://
bit.ly/30wLkPh [hereinafter Napolitano Memorandum].
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DHS had failed to consider whether DACA recipients’ participation in 
employment, education, medical treatment, military service, or fam-
ily life formed expectations—“reliance interests” in legal parlance—
that the agency had to accommodate. Moreover, DHS had failed to 
consider alternatives to DACA’s total rescission, such as allowing a 
longer wind-down of the program or keeping the reprieve from re-
moval but ending eligibility for benefits.
The stewardship outlined in Roberts’s opinion is deliberative, not 
substantive: it is about process, not outcomes. Roberts conceded that 
DHS had the power to end DACA, which DHS, based on the conclusion 
of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, had in September 2017 found to be 
unlawful.5 DHS could have justified the rescission by stating in writing 
that enforcing the INA outweighed recipients’ reliance interests. How-
ever, in ending the program, Roberts explained, an agency had to at 
least address the interests of stakeholders as part of “the agency’s job” 
and its “responsibility.”6 Roberts did not mention stewardship per se 
in his opinion. Nevertheless, framing deliberation as a core component 
of “responsibility” for a “job” casts DHS’s failure in stewardship terms. 
A sound steward may safeguard a trust by choosing any one of several 
paths. But stewardship cannot be random or heedless. It requires ap-
propriate consideration of the risks and benefits of each choice.
The model of stewardship reflected in Roberts’s opinion in Regents 
has two prongs. The first is consistency: a good steward will delib-
erate carefully before taking action and stick with the reasons that 
drove her initial decision rather than dangle a string of shifting justi-
fications before befuddled stakeholders. In addition, a good steward 
will balance the equities of all parties and of the public.7
5  Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
James W. McCament et al., Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://bit.ly/2DJPcDy [hereinafter Duke Memorandum]; Letter from 
Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y General of the United States, to Elaine Duke, Acting 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 4, 2017), https://bit.ly/3kl3zz1 [hereinafter 
Sessions Letter].
6  140 S. Ct. at 1908–09.
7  See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426, 434 (2009) (noting that stay of removal pend-
ing appeal hinges not merely on merits of case, but also on hardship to the applicant, 
the countervailing factor of hardship to other parties, and consideration of the public 
interest); see also Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (noting factors for pre-
liminary injunction); see generally Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: 
Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 
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To promote consistency in Regents, Roberts invoked an administra-
tive law standby, the Chenery doctrine, which holds that an agency ex-
plaining a decision gets only one bite at the apple.8 Courts look at how 
the agency explained its action when the action was taken, not how the 
agency explains it later, once litigation about the action is underway. 
Reading Chenery broadly, Roberts was able to force DHS off its most 
favored turf. DHS had to stand or fall with Acting Secretary Duke’s 
stark conclusion in 2017 that DACA was unlawful. Because of Roberts’s 
broad reading of Chenery and its “one bite at the apple” rule, Roberts 
simply refused to consider the more comprehensive 2018 justification by 
Duke’s successor as acting secretary, Kirstjen Nielsen, that DACA was 
flawed from both a legal and a policy perspective.9 But, as Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh noted in his dissent, Roberts’s broad reading of Chenery may 
be a stretch. The Chenery doctrine is most effective in stopping agency 
lawyers in litigation who would otherwise invent new rationales from 
scratch.10 Acting Secretary Nielsen’s 2018 justification came from a re-
sponsible agency official—one asked to create that filing by a district 
judge, no less—not a desperate lawyer in the throes of litigation.
Complementing Justice Kavanaugh’s critique of the consistency 
prong in Roberts’s opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that 
Roberts’s stress on recipients’ reliance interests ignored the INA’s 
structure. According to Justice Thomas, the INA is a “carefully crafted 
scheme” that specifically enumerates classes of people entitled legally 
to enter the country, including close relatives of citizens and current 
lawful permanent residents (LPRs), skilled employees, and refugees, 
94 B.U. L. Rev. 105 (2014) (discussing stewardship and discretion in immigration law 
administration); Peter Margulies, Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State: 
Adjudicating DACA, the Census, and the Military’s Transgender Policy, 71 Fla. L. Rev. 
1429, 1467–74 (2019) (discussing DACA rescission).
8  140 S. Ct. at 1909 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)).
9  Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
(June 22, 2018), https://bit.ly/33vMMDC [hereinafter Nielsen Memorandum]. After 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Regents, current DHS Acting Secretary Chad Wolf 
rescinded both the Duke Memorandum and the Nielsen Memorandum, and informed 
the public that he was considering rescinding the Napolitano Memorandum that had 
announced DACA. Acting Secretary Wolf took a number of interim steps, including 
barring new DACA applications. See Chad F. Wolf, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Home-
land Sec., Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States 
as Children” (July 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3a3cG2P.
10  140 S. Ct. at 1934–35 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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as well as nonimmigrants such as students and tourists.11 Other for-
eign nationals seeking to enter or remain in the United States often 
lack either a visa that confers a lawful status or any reasonable path 
for gaining a lawful status. Taking the INA’s structure seriously, im-
migration officials should not second-guess Congress’s methodical 
distinction between foreign nationals who can receive a lawful status 
and those without a reasonable chance for that status. Nor should 
immigration officials grant crucial components of lawful status, such 
as a reprieve from removal or eligibility for a work permit, to a large 
group of otherwise removable foreign nationals. As a “sweeping 
nonenforcement program,” DACA undermined the INA’s structural 
integrity, in much the same way as the Obama administration’s De-
ferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program, which had 
never gone into operation because courts had enjoined it as exceeding 
the power that Congress had delegated to immigration officials.12
While the question is a close one, ultimately Chief Justice Roberts’s 
vision of deliberative stewardship best fits history and practice re-
garding prospective Americans. Roberts’s emphasis on consistency 
echoes his rejection in Department of Commerce v. New York of the 
Commerce Department’s “pretextual” justification for adding a 
citizenship question to the census.13 Moreover, Roberts’s analy-
sis is compatible with Thomas’s structural approach. According to 
Roberts, DHS could readily have reached its desired outcome of end-
ing DACA. To do so, DHS merely had to expressly balance DACA 
recipients’ reliance interests, the public interest, and enforcement of 
the INA. Given the interests at stake, that balancing is a reasonable 
expectation that leaves the INA’s structure intact.
This article, like Gaul, is divided into three parts. Part I provides 
background on DACA and DAPA, including the courts’ reliance on a 
structural argument in their rejection of DAPA, before discussing the 
Trump administration’s effort to rescind DACA. Part II outlines the his-
tory of an alternative to the structural argument—a stewardship model 
that this article traces back to the Founding era. Part III examines Chief 
Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Regents in light of the stewardship 
model and contrasts Roberts’s analysis with the insightful arguments 
made in dissent by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh.
11  Id. at 1930 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12  Id. at 1923–26, 1930.
13  139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
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I.  President Obama’s Immigration Initiatives and President Trump’s 
Response: DACA, DAPA, and the Structure of the INA
DACA was a presidential response to a legislative logjam. As a U.S. 
senator, Barack Obama wrote about meeting a third-grade student, 
Cristina, with an uncertain immigration status. That encounter, at which 
Cristina asked for then-Senator Obama’s autograph, prompted Obama to 
reflect that the most urgent risk was not being “overrun by those who do 
not look like us,” but failing to “recognize the humanity of Cristina and 
her family.”14 As president, Obama failed to persuade Congress to act on 
this sentiment by passing the DREAM Act, which would have provided 
legal immigration status to noncitizens who arrived in the United States 
as children.15 Since the overwhelming majority of noncitizens in this cat-
egory did not have a lawful immigration status, Congress’s failure to 
act meant that noncitizens in this group faced removal. Pondering the 
human predicament that Congress had not resolved, Obama took ex-
ecutive action through DHS. President Obama later announced a larger 
immigration initiative: DAPA. Finally, in 2017, DHS under the Trump 
administration announced that it was rescinding DACA.
A. DACA’s Criteria
Following President Obama’s lead, then–DHS Secretary Janet 
Napolitano issued a memorandum announcing DACA on June 15, 2012. 
DACA did not confer a lawful immigration status on the “Dreamers” 
who were children when they entered the United States; only Congress 
can establish specific categories that lead to lawful permanent resident 
(LPR) status or various temporary nonimmigrant forms of status, such 
as students, tourists, or temporary workers. Rather, DACA granted eli-
gible foreign nationals a renewable reprieve from deportation (called 
“removal” under current immigration laws) and permission to apply 
for a work permit.16
14  Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American 
Dream 318 (2006).
15  See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (as reintroduced 2011).
16  See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 4. Compare Robert J. Delahunty & John 
C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, 
the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 856 (2013) (asserting that 
DACA went beyond the scope of delegation), with Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond De-
portation: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases 54–59 (2015) (argu-
ing that the ambit of discretion under INA included large-scale programs such as DACA).
23205_06_Margulies.indd   131 9/7/20   11:45 AM
Cato Supreme Court review
132
To be eligible, an applicant had to have come to the United States 
before reaching the age of 16. In addition, to ensure that applicants 
had sustained ties to this country, the applicant had to have re-
sided continuously in the United States for at least five years before 
June 15, 2012, and be a resident of the United States on that date. 
Targeting DACA’s benefits to those who had pursued an education 
or service, an applicant had to be currently enrolled in school, have 
received a high school diploma or general education development 
(GED) certificate, or be an honorably discharged veteran of the U.S. 
Armed Forces. To winnow out foreign nationals who had engaged in 
crime, Napolitano also ruled out any applicant who had a felony or 
“significant misdemeanor” conviction on her record or multiple mis-
demeanor convictions, or in any other way might threaten national 
security or public safety. Finally, to keep the program manageable 
and focused on young people who had not yet had a chance to build 
their lives, applicants could be no more than 30 years old.17
B.  An Attempt to Build on DACA: DAPA’s Introduction and Chilly 
Reception in the Courts
Following up on DACA and responding to continued inaction by 
Congress, President Obama sought additional programs to aid un-
documented foreign nationals. In November 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh 
Johnson, Napolitano’s successor, announced the Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans (DAPA) program. DAPA extended DACA-style 
treatment—a two-year renewable reprieve from removal and eligibil-
ity for a work permit—to a much larger group: parents of U.S. citizens.18 
17  DHS also classified DACA recipients as “lawfully present” and thus eligible for 
driver’s licenses.
18  See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs, Thomas S. Winkowski, 
Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 3, 5 (Nov. 20, 2014); Memorandum from Karl R. 
Thompson, Prip’l Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., The Department of 
Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully 
Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others (Nov. 19, 2014), https://
bit.ly/3gu7F5L [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum]. The Fifth Circuit ultimately 
held that DAPA went beyond Congress’s delegation of power to the executive branch 
under the INA. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an 
equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); cf. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality 
of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 213, 284 (2015) 
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The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) estimated 
that over four million undocumented foreign nationals—roughly 
40 percent of the United States’s undocumented population—would 
be eligible. Although some DAPA-eligible persons had a theoretical 
path to acquiring LPR status because their children were U.S. citizens, 
in most cases that path would have been very difficult.19
In challenges to DAPA brought by states, including Texas, the 
Fifth Circuit held that deferred action of DAPA’s size and scope con-
flicted with the INA’s framework.20 Its analysis applied most clearly 
to DAPA’s grant of eligibility for work permits and other benefits. 
While the government had some discretion in merely deciding not 
to remove foreign nationals, its decision to grant the “benefits of law-
ful presence” to a large group of undocumented noncitizens clashed 
(arguing that DAPA exceeded presidential power). The author of this article served as 
cocounsel for amici curiae at all phases of the Texas litigation, including proceedings 
before the Supreme Court, arguing that DAPA clashed with the structure and logic 
of the INA. See Brief for Former Homeland Security, Justice, and State Department 
Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, United States v. Texas, 136 S. 
Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674). In lower courts, the author served as cocounsel with Ilya 
Shapiro of the Cato Institute and Josh Blackman of South Texas College of Law, along 
with Leif Olson of the Olson Law Firm. Brief as Friends of the Court Supporting Plain-
tiffs of the Cato Institute and Law Professors, Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 
(S.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 14-254), https://bit.ly/3a1FRmG.
19  See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (requiring that a U.S. citizen be at least 21 years old 
to sponsor a parent for an immigrant visa); see also Thompson Memorandum, supra 
note 18, at 29 n.14 (conceding that many DAPA recipients would “need to leave the 
country to obtain a visa at a U.S. consulate abroad”; because of some period of unlaw-
ful presence in the United States, a DAPA recipient would then “in most instances” be 
subject to either a 3- or 10-year statutory bar on reentry into the United States, requir-
ing her to wait outside the United States “for the duration of the bar”).
20  Texas, 809 F.3d at 180. For commentary on DAPA, compare Adam B. Cox & Cristina 
M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 Yale L.J. 104, 144–51 
(2015) (discussing rationale for DAPA based on consistency with the INA, while also 
suggesting that a better rationale would look to Congress and the president as coprin-
cipals in crafting immigration law), and Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where 
Administrative Law Meets the Constitution, 108 Geo. L.J. 1, 57–61 (2019) (suggesting 
that the Take Care Clause provided authority for DAPA), with Peter Margulies, The 
Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immi-
gration Law, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1244–52 (2015) (arguing that DAPA exceeded 
power Congress had delegated to the executive branch), and Zachary S. Price, En-
forcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 671, 674–75 (2014) (assert-
ing that the Constitution curbs president’s power to decline to enforce the law).
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with the INA.21 In an earlier decision denying a stay of the district 
court’s preliminary injunction against DAPA’s operation, the Fifth 
Circuit explained that the INA included precise categories of foreign 
nationals allowed to enter or remain in the United States.22 Accord-
ing to the Fifth Circuit, Congress’s enumeration of “narrow classes” 
of foreign nationals allowed to enter and remain and a large residual 
group subject to removal served an important purpose in Congress’s 
plan: it protected the jobs of U.S. citizen and LPR workers.23 The court 
reasoned that, from Congress’s perspective, dramatically expanding 
the pool of foreign nationals eligible for employment could cloud the 
jobs outlook for citizens and LPRs.
To address this concern, the Fifth Circuit explained, Congress and 
immigration officials had limited the scale and scope of deferred ac-
tion. Grants of deferred action have typically served as “bridges” to 
a lawful status or have entailed “country-specific” responses to war, 
political turmoil, or natural disasters such as hurricanes and earth-
quakes. Deferred action is also available in a small number of cases 
involving hardships, such as extreme youth, sickness, or old age. In 
light of the INA’s detailed framework, it was unlikely that Congress, 
without saying so in the law, had also given immigration officials 
sweeping power to grant deferred action to millions of otherwise re-
movable noncitizens. As Justice Antonin Scalia said, Congress does 
not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”24 Based on this analysis, the 
Fifth Circuit found that DAPA exceeded executive power under the 
immigration laws, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision by 
an equally divided 4-4 vote after Justice Scalia’s passing.
C. DACA’s Rescission under the Trump Administration
Although DAPA never went into effect, DACA was in full swing 
through the remainder of the Obama administration and the first 
months of the Trump presidency. In the summer of 2017, however, 
21  Texas, 809 F.3d at 180 (noting tension with statutory scheme).
22  Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 759–61 (5th Cir. 2015).
23  Texas, 809 F.3d at 181 (remarking that “‘a primary purpose in restricting immigra-
tion is to preserve jobs’” for U.S. citizens) (citation omitted). But see Ilya Somin, Free to 
Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom (2020) (arguing that immigration 
enhances employment prospects for citizens and lawful residents).
24  Texas, 787 F.3d at 760 n.86 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 
468 (2001)).
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a number of states that had sued to stop DAPA, led by Texas, wrote 
a letter to the Trump administration arguing that DACA was illegal 
for the same structural reasons that the Fifth Circuit had cited in af-
firming the preliminary injunction against DAPA. The states threat-
ened a lawsuit against DACA. In September 2017, Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions wrote a letter asserting that DACA also lacked “proper 
statutory authority” and thus was an “unconstitutional” exercise of 
executive power, citing the Fifth Circuit’s DAPA decision.25 Acting 
DHS Secretary Elaine Duke followed up with a memorandum that 
announced DHS’s intention to rescind the program, referring to the 
stark legal conclusion in Sessions’s letter and finding, without fur-
ther explanation, that DACA was illegal.
Secretary Duke did not summarily revoke DACA’s terms for re-
cipients. In a nod to the “complexities . . . [of] winding down the 
program,” DHS agreed to process all initial applications then in the 
pipeline and all renewal requests from recipients whose two-year 
term would expire by March 5, 2018.26 Since Chief Justice Roberts 
highlighted the choices that DHS’s wind-down entailed and the lack 
of explanation for those choices, further detail is useful.
Under Duke’s rescission plan, DHS would not accept new DACA 
applications after the issuance of her memorandum and the group 
of some 700,000 DACA recipients would lose benefits on a staggered 
basis, starting on March 6, 2018, with all benefits terminating by 
March 6, 2020. As an illustration, consider a DACA recipient whose 
two-year period of participation in the program was due to termi-
nate on March 6, 2018. The recipient hoped to renew her participation 
for an additional two-year period. Renewal was crucial, because the 
recipient had started a four-year undergraduate college program in 
September 2016, planning to major in computer science. If all went 
according to plan, the recipient would graduate from college in May 
2020. Duke’s wind-down would have changed those plans, because 
it barred renewals for periods of participation that expired after 
March 5, 2018. Under Duke’s wind-down, the recipient would lose 
DACA almost two years into her undergraduate program, with slightly 
over two years remaining before she was due to obtain her degree.
25  Sessions Letter, supra note 5. The Fifth Circuit did not discuss DAPA’s constitu-
tionality, since the court held that DAPA was invalid on statutory grounds, making 
resolution of the constitutional issue unnecessary.
26  Duke Memorandum, supra note 5.
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A number of courts enjoined the DACA rescission within months 
of its issuance, holding that Secretary Duke’s explanation for the re-
scission was insufficient.27 One court required DHS to submit a more 
detailed explanation.28 In June 2018, new Acting Secretary Kirstjen 
Nielsen did so, including both legal and policy arguments. In her 
legal discussion, Nielsen affirmed Attorney General Sessions’s con-
clusion that DACA was unlawful in light of the Fifth Circuit’s DAPA 
ruling. Citing the logic and structure of the INA discussed earlier, 
Nielsen explained that the Fifth Circuit had held that granting de-
ferred action to a large group of otherwise removable foreign nation-
als was “contrary to the statutory scheme” of specific forms of legal 
status and a residual category of foreign nationals subject to removal.
In her policy discussion, Nielsen again cited the structural ac-
count of the INA to pinpoint what she termed “serious doubts” 
about DACA’s lawfulness. According to Nielsen, it was reasonable 
to rescind a policy in the face of such doubts, rather than maintain 
it in the face of legal challenges from states. Nielsen added a related 
policy concern that in her view Congress, not the executive, should 
authorize programs as extensive as DACA, thereby providing more 
certainty and predictability than the executive branch could offer. 
Nielsen also articulated a general preference in administrative 
trade-craft for case-by-case determinations about deferred action, 
not the sweeping criteria that DACA entailed. In addition, Nielsen 
contended that a program such as DACA would send confusing sig-
nals about the government’s commitment to enforcing Congress’s 
scheme, especially given what Nielsen called “unacceptably high 
levels” of unlawful immigration.
Finally, Nielsen discounted the expectations of DACA recipients 
that they would be able to stay in the United States or at least com-
plete projects here, such as courses of study or medical treatment. She 
observed that DACA was always intended to be temporary. Reinforc-
ing her denigration of recipients’ reliance interests, Nielsen stressed 
that Obama administration officials, when implementing DACA, 
27  See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 505–10 
(9th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 237–43 (D.D.C. 2018) (NAACP I); see also 
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 467–73 (D.D.C. 2018) (NAACP II) (finding new 
explanation by then–Acting DHS Secretary Nielsen inadequate).
28  See NAACP I, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 245.
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had expressly refused to grant recipients any enforceable legal rights 
in DACA’s continuation. In any case, Nielsen concluded, in the ab-
sence of congressional approval for DACA, the erosion of the INA’s 
structure caused by enabling the “continued presence” of a large 
group of foreign nationals without a lawful status outweighed any 
reliance interests that the program may have instilled.29
While lower courts gave the DACA rescission an unfavorable re-
ception, their rationales were unpersuasive. In an illustrative exam-
ple, the Ninth Circuit minimized both the structural concerns that 
had driven the Fifth Circuit to hold that DAPA was unlawful and 
the relevance of those concerns to DACA.30 The Ninth Circuit analo-
gized DACA to earlier uses of deferred action, failing to acknowl-
edge that those earlier occasions encompassed either a bridge to a 
legal status or a response to hardship such as extreme youth, age, 
or infirmity. DACA failed to fit the “bridge” category; the program 
was beneficial to recipients precisely because they had no reasonably 
available path to a legal status. Taking the broadest possible view of 
the “hardship” category, DACA barely fit. DACA recipients came to 
the United States as children, and thus had something in common 
with past deferred action recipients who received benefits because 
of their youth. DACA recipients are a varied group, however, includ-
ing some people as old as 29 who can still qualify for the program. 
If DACA’s dimensions failed to fit either the “bridge” or “hardship” 
categories, the program conflicted with the INA’s framework.
The Ninth Circuit and other courts failed to acknowledge the 
scope of this structural problem, let alone resolve it. As of June 2020, 
the key question was whether the Supreme Court would find a more 
satisfying approach to the difficult issues posed by the Trump ad-
ministration’s attempt to rescind DACA.
II. Stewardship and Prospective Americans
As an alternative to the structural analysis outlined above and 
in Justice Thomas’s Regents dissent, consider an approach based on 
stewardship. As I conceive it, stewardship is not a license for the 
free-floating exercise of presidential power; instead it resides in the 
second category of Justice Robert Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, 
29  See Nielsen Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2–3.
30  See Regents, 908 F.3d at 505–10.
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as a gap-filler in cases of statutory silence.31 From the Founding era, 
Congress and the public have expected that presidents will assume 
responsibility for the welfare of refugees and other prospective 
Americans imperiled by hostile nonfederal sovereigns. In that sense, 
deferred action is part of the foreign affairs toolkit. As described by 
the Supreme Court in previous decisions, immigration officials’ “de-
ferred action” in lieu of removal can spring from this stewardship 
rationale.32 Indeed, President Obama’s rationale for DACA entailed 
similar reasoning. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Regents suggests 
that once the executive branch has chosen to offer such protection, 
officials must deliberate soundly about the reasons for ending it.
A. The Framers, Historical Practice, and Stewardship’s Central Values
The Framers were familiar with stewardship and similar concepts 
such as the role of the fiduciary in assuming responsibility for oth-
ers. In Federalist No. 23, Alexander Hamilton analogized govern-
ment to a private fiduciary, urging that “government ought to be 
clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its 
trust.”33 Consistency is a watchword of the stewardship envisioned 
by the Framers, while volatility is its antithesis.
For Hamilton, consistency was built into the virtues of the presi-
dency, including decisiveness. The Framers sought a Constitution 
with a strong federal government in part to ensure that the nation 
spoke with “one voice” in world affairs, instead of shifting between 
31  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring); see also id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that legislative 
acquiescence should prompt judicial deference); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654 (1981) (upholding presidential claims settlement as reflecting longstanding prac-
tice in which Congress has acquiesced); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb–Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (2008) (analyzing Youngstown’s implications); 
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Pow-
ers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 415 (2012); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Congress and the President 
in Wartime, Lawfare (blog), Nov. 29, 2017, reviewing David Barron, Waging War: The 
Clash Between Presidents and Congress, 1776 to ISIS (2016), https://bit.ly/2XzFMlv.
32  See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408–09 (2012) (warning that overzealous immigration 
enforcement by the several states could undermine federal decisions to extend con-
sideration to undocumented foreign nationals in the United States who were “college 
student[s]” or had some other functional tie to the country).
33  See The Federalist No. 23, supra note 1, at 153–54; see also Kent et al., supra note 1, at 
2130 (discussing the president’s oath of office and the Constitution’s Take Care Clause, 
which both commit the president to faithful execution of the laws of the United States).
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the multiplicity of agendas that might drive individual states within 
the new republic.34 Indeed, in Rutgers v. Waddington, a celebrated case 
prior to the Constitution’s enactment, Hamilton persuaded a New 
York court to look to the law of nations as a guide in a property 
dispute in which New York law appeared to conflict with the treaty 
between the United States and Britain that concluded the Revolu-
tionary War.35 Judged from a stewardship perspective, consistency 
over time yields the same virtues as decisiveness in the executive 
branch or a single voice in a nation’s foreign relations.
Equitable balancing is also central to deliberative stewardship. A 
fiduciary exercising sound stewardship will rarely if ever consider 
just one factor. Instead, the steward will discern how various fac-
tors interact. For example, in the law of remedies, courts address the 
“balance of hardships” among the parties, as well as the public in-
terest. In some cases, equity will require a “fine adjustment” among 
competing interests, which the judge should analyze in crafting 
remedies.36
Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis in Nken v. Holder. There, 
Roberts outlined the test for a stay pending appeal of a removal 
34  Arizona, 567 U.S. at 409.
35  N.Y. Mayor’s Ct. 1784, reprinted in 1 The Law Practice of Hamilton: Documents and 
Commentary 393, 405 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1964) (explaining that, because of logic of 
federal system established by Articles of Confederation, each of the several states must 
be bound by international law when conflicts arise between any one state’s law and in-
ternational law, and warning of the “confusion” that would arise “if each separate state 
should arrogate to itself a right of changing at pleasure” precepts of the law of nations). 
On the importance of the Rutgers decision to U.S. foreign relations law and the evolving 
institution of judicial review, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York 
and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830, 193–99 
(2005); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 932, 963–66 (2010). Along these lines, provisions in the Constitution and the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 stemmed from the Framers’ concerns that individual states were failing 
to punish violations of international law, including violations of the principle of diplo-
matic immunity. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–18 (2004).
36  See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (noting that “the qualities of 
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and rec-
onciliation between the public interest and private needs”); see also Winter v. NRDC, 
555 U.S. 7, 24–26 (2008) (holding that in issuing and affirming injunction against navy 
training exercises, lower courts had failed to adequately take into account public inter-
est served by the exercises); but see Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age 
of Statutes, 96 Va. L. Rev. 485, 513–20 (2010) (criticizing Winter’s reading of equitable 
balancing as not giving sufficient weight to Congress’s plan).
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order—a judicial variant of the reprieve prong of DACA.37 Roberts 
wrote that a judge can consider whether removal would result in 
irreparable harm and whether the “balance of hardships” and the 
public interest favored the applicant for a stay. A court must deter-
mine whether a noncitizen’s removal prior to full adjudication of her 
appeal would unduly impede her ability to appeal and thus relegate 
appellate review to an “‘idle ceremony.’”38 Impeding a court’s chance 
to consider a colorable claim for relief on appeal injures the applicant 
for a stay, but also adversely affects the public interest in a prop-
erly functioning means of appellate review. Conversely, an appellate 
court should also determine whether a stay would injure the public 
interest served by efficient enforcement of immigration law.
Weighing of the public interest has also figured in executive 
branch decisions to provide assistance to prospective Americans. 
Before DACA, examples of practice in this vein started with a cau-
tionary counter example during the John Adams administration and 
proceeded through President Theodore Roosevelt’s intervention in 
the San Francisco school crisis of 1906–1907. In each case, a president 
either earned scorn for failing to help or acted decisively to intervene.
In the first example—a cautionary tale of stewardship’s absence—
President John Adams infuriated both Congress and the public by 
his delivery to British custody of Thomas Nash, who claimed to be 
a U.S. citizen named Jonathan Robbins. Britain then tried and ex-
ecuted Nash on charges of mutiny.39 Americans at the time viewed 
mutiny as a valid response to brutal British navy discipline and im-
pressment of foreign seamen, including those from U.S. vessels. In 
addition, Jefferson and others argued that mutiny was a political 
37  Nken, 556 U.S. 418. A stay pending appeal differs from DACA-style relief since 
an applicant for a stay first must receive a removal order from DHS, while a DACA 
recipient could participate in the program without ever being in removal proceedings. 
Moreover, a stay pending appeal lasts only so long as the court needs to resolve the 
appeal, while DACA is renewable indefinitely. But both a stay and DACA enable a 
reprieve from removal.
38  Id. at 427 (citing Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 (1942)).
39  See Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 7, at 134–36; see also 
John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of 
Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1973, 1975 n.10 (2010) (describing episode as a “cautionary 
tale . . . for decades to come”); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of 
Jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale L.J. 229 (1990) (providing comprehensive analysis of this 
episode).
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crime that targeted an oppressive system and was therefore not an 
appropriate subject for extradition. Indeed, Jefferson was skeptical 
about extradition because of the difficulty of distinguishing ordi-
nary from political crimes.40 The intervention on Nash’s behalf that 
Adams rejected would have provided a clear, consistent signal of 
the president’s dedication to rescuing prospective Americans. Mesh-
ing with the public interest, intervention would also have dovetailed 
with evolving U.S. conceptions of human rights and more mundane 
U.S. interests in a growing merchant fleet.
The response to Adams’s failure to save Nash underlined the im-
portance of stewardship to safeguarding prospective Americans. 
Adams was almost impeached. He lost the election of 1800, the Fed-
eralists ceased to be a significant political force, and extradition be-
came a dead letter for decades. Adams’s default in Nash’s case was 
not the only cause of the first two events, but it was a primary fac-
tor in the third development and crystallized sentiment that led to 
Adams’s loss and the Federalists’ precipitous decline.
In the second example, President Franklin Pierce lived up to 
the stewardship model’s expectations. Pierce intervened to rescue 
Hungarian dissident Martin Koszta, who had lived in New York be-
fore being kidnaped by Austrian agents while in Turkey.41 Secretary 
of State William Marcy articulated a consistent test, announcing that 
the United States would use its power to protect individuals any-
where around the world who had established a domicile in the United 
States. Marcy linked the United States’s intervention with the public 
interest in compliance with the “laws of humanity . . . [that] protect 
the weak from being oppressed by the strong, and . . . relieve the 
distressed.”42 This rationale suggests that for Marcy and President 
Pierce, positioning the United States in the vanguard of that hu-
mane effort would also enhance the nation’s global reputation and 
40  See Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to George Washington, President (Nov. 7, 
1791), https://bit.ly/33qSXJ8 (advising Washington that it was often “difficult to draw the 
line between [ordinary crimes] . . . and acts rendered criminal by tyrannical laws only”).
41  Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 7, at 138–41; In re Neagle, 
135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).
42  See Hon. William M. Marcy, Secretary of State, to Baron von Hulsemann, Austrian 
Charge D’Affaires, Sept. 26, 1853, in Correspondence Between the Secretary of 
State and the Charge D’Affaires of Austria Relative to the Case of Martin Koszta 16 
(1853), https://bit.ly/30u3qlc.
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thus further U.S. interests. In In re Neagle, the Court cited the Koszta 
episode for the proposition that presidential stewardship includes 
not merely the “express terms” of treaties and statutes, but also U.S. 
“international relations and all the protection [of federal officials, 
U.S. nationals, and intending Americans like Koszta] implied by the 
nature of the government under the Constitution.”43
B. Stewardship and Federalism
In an early 20th-century episode, President Theodore Roosevelt 
and his secretary of state, Elihu Root, practiced stewardship in their 
resolution of the San Francisco segregation dispute of 1906–1907. Act-
ing under California law, San Francisco had sought to establish seg-
regated schools for Japanese children domiciled in the United States 
with their families. A treaty between Japan and the United States 
gave those children rights to the same education as other foreign na-
tional children, including those from Europe. Roosevelt ordered fed-
eral troops into position to stop any violence against San Francisco’s 
Japanese community and sued to enjoin the city’s policy.44 Elabo-
rating on the rationale for Roosevelt’s handling of the segregation 
dispute, Root echoed the concern with consistency and the public 
interest that drove Hamilton’s arguments in Rutgers v. Waddington. 
Root faulted local passions, which could impede the consistency re-
quired for foreign affairs and erode “rules . . . essential to the main-
tenance of peace . . . between nations.”45
In the last 40 years, stewardship has figured in federal responses 
to overly aggressive state immigration enforcement that could derail 
U.S. foreign policy. In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court struck down a 
Texas law that excluded undocumented children from public school.46 
While Justice William Brennan, writing for the Court, analyzed the 
43  135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890); see also John Harrison, The Story of In re Neagle: Sex, Money, 
Politics, Perjury, Homicide, Federalism, and Executive Power, in Presidential Power 
Stories 133, 153–54 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (discuss-
ing role of Koszta episode in Neagle); cf. Henry Monaghan, The Protective Power of the 
Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 70–71 (1993) (arguing against unduly broad reading of 
Neagle that might result in presidential overreaching).
44  See Elihu Root, The Real Questions under the Japanese Treaty and the San 
Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 273, 276 (1907).
45  Id. at 273–74.
46  457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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case in equal–protection terms, Brennan’s opinion framed undocu-
mented children as recipients of a kind of tacit de facto deferred ac-
tion in which federal officials expressly conceded that they could 
not deport each undocumented child. The likelihood that many 
undocumented children would grow up knowing only the United 
States as their home highlighted the need for stewardship’s virtues 
of consistency and equitable balancing. Justice Brennan remarked 
on Congress’s power, which the Court has repeatedly recognized, 
to set consistent national policy regarding immigration, contrasting 
that with states’ patchwork of immigration measures. Moreover, he 
wrote, Texas’s law impinged on the broader public interest in educat-
ing children. State laws impeding undocumented children’s access 
to public education would “foreclose any realistic possibility that . . . 
[undocumented children] will contribute in even the smallest way to 
the progress of our Nation.”47
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court again addressed 
the conflict between restrictive state measures and federal steward-
ship.48 Finding that Congress had preempted some of Arizona’s laws 
on immigration enforcement, the Court cited Federalist No. 3, in 
which John Jay had warned of border states’ habit of “sudden irrita-
tion” and resulting skirmishes with foreign states.49 For Jay, easing 
the country back from the brink of war required the more “temper-
ate and cool” perspective of the federal government, which could 
cultivate that longer-term outlook because it was physically further 
from the fraught border.50
Applying Jay’s insights, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that states 
could undermine U.S. foreign policy and the overall public interest 
through “harassment” of foreign nationals who were students pur-
suing higher education, veterans of the armed forces, or witnesses 
in criminal cases.51 In a nod to consistency, Justice Kennedy warned 
that the Framers crafted the Constitution in part to spare a foreign 
country from dealing with “50 separate states,” instead of a single 
47  Id. at 230.
48  567 U.S. 387 (2012); Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 7, at 
162–65.
49  Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395 (citing The Federalist No. 3 (John Jay)).
50  The Federalist No. 3 (John Jay).
51  Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408.
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central government that could efficiently address foreign concerns. 
For Kennedy, deferred action allowed the federal government to 
practice that consistency and speak with “one voice” in the volatile 
realm of foreign relations.52
President Obama’s initiation of DACA fit within this steward-
ship model. As foreign nationals who arrived in the United States 
as children and had often known no other country as home, DACA 
recipients were a fit subject for interstitial executive protection. 
DACA also shielded these hardship cases from overzealous state en-
forcement efforts of the kind the Court had curtailed in Plyler and 
Arizona. Recipients aided the public interest, since they were able to 
contribute their time, effort, and talent to the American project, as 
Justice Brennan had envisioned in Plyler. The program’s categorical 
approach provided consistency and certainty that a more piecemeal 
approach to immigration relief would have lacked.
The Trump administration had a different approach, which 
prompted judicial skepticism even before Regents. In a 2019 case en-
compassing the public interest and undocumented immigrants, the 
Court in Department of Commerce v. New York required consistency in 
the Trump administration’s rationale for adding a citizenship ques-
tion to the census.53 Adding a citizenship question would have been 
a departure from recent practice: although the government had in-
cluded a citizenship question in the past as part of its constitutional 
duty to conduct a census, officials for 60 years had not included this 
query. Pre-Trump officials had resisted reintroducing a citizenship 
question, explaining that this move would deter participation since 
undocumented individuals and their families would fear that an 
accurate response would prompt immigration enforcement action. 
Reduced participation would skew the population count and with 
it calculations on congressional representation, the composition of 
state legislatures, and federal funding.54
Against this backdrop of a high-stakes decision affecting the 
public interest that pivoted from decades-long agency practice, 
52  Id. at 409.
53  139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). For commentary on the census decision, see Jennifer Chacón, 
The Inside-Out Constitution: Department of Commerce v. New York, 2019 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 231 (2019); Margulies, Rescinding Inclusion, supra note 7, at 1461–67; Gillian E. 
Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (2019).
54  Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2562, 2565.
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the Court held that the Commerce Department’s rationale for seek-
ing to reintroduce a citizenship question was “pretextual.”55 Writ-
ing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the secretary of 
commerce had the power to decide to add a citizenship question. But 
he also indicated that, under accepted principles of administrative 
law, the government when making such “important decisions” had 
to offer “genuine justifications” that will survive judicial and public 
scrutiny.56 In the census case, the Court found that Commerce Sec-
retary Wilbur Ross had failed in his duty to provide such a sincere 
justification. Instead, Ross had “contrived” a pretextual rationale by 
persuading reluctant Department of Justice officials to assert that a 
citizenship question would provide information necessary for com-
pliance with the Voting Rights Act.57
That “disconnect” in the census case between a high-stakes de-
cision and the “contrived” official reason for the agency’s choice 
would, if accepted by the Court, have made judicial review into an 
“empty ritual.”58 Here, Chief Justice Roberts’s description echoed his 
concern in Nken v. Holder that a stay of removal pending appeal was 
necessary to avoid making appellate review an “idle ceremony.”59 
Sound stewards do not have the time for either empty rituals or idle 
ceremonies. Moreover, they do not impose such futile exercises on 
others. Secretary Ross’s “pretextual” rationale thus compromised 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement of “[r]easoned 
decisionmaking.”60 While Chief Justice Roberts did not find that Act-
ing DHS Secretary Duke’s reasons for ending DACA were similarly 
contrived, he did identify flaws in her justification that also violated 
the APA’s “reasoned decisionmaking” goal.
III. The Court’s DACA Decision: Stewardship Over Structure
This preliminary discussion of stewardship sets the stage for anal-
ysis of Chief Justice Roberts’s discussion in Regents. In his opinion 
finding DHS’s rationale for rescission inadequate, Roberts sounded 
55  Id. at 2574.
56  Id. at 2575.
57  Id.
58  Id. at 2575–76.
59  Nken, 556 U.S. at 427.
60  Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2576.
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three themes in the key of stewardship. First, Roberts focused on 
the Duke Memorandum, describing the later Nielsen Memorandum 
as an impermissible “post hoc rationalization.”61 Second, Roberts 
described DACA recipients’ expectations that the program would 
continue, and the Duke Memorandum’s failure to acknowledge and 
address those expectations. Third, Roberts asserted that the Duke 
Memorandum should have considered other options besides out-
right termination of the entire program; in particular, Duke should 
have considered separating out the reprieve and work permit parts 
of the program and continuing the reprieve component.
The third point is striking because Chief Justice Roberts disagreed 
with lower-court rulings that viewed DACA as one unified exercise 
of executive discretion, instead agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s 
framing of the reprieve/benefits distinction in the DAPA case. But, 
compared with the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Roberts’s use of this 
frame had a very different practical effect. In the DAPA case, the Fifth 
Circuit had cited the inclusion of eligibility for benefits as a basis 
for invalidating the program. In contrast, Roberts found fault with 
DHS’s insufficient consideration of the consequences of rescinding 
both parts of DACA and sent the agency back to the drawing board. 
I call his process-based mode of analysis “deliberative stewardship,” 
to distinguish it from the stronger, substantive brand of stewardship 
that President Theodore Roosevelt championed.
A.  Stewardship as Consistency: Reading Chenery Broadly to Limit DHS 
to One Bite at the Apple
After determining that courts could review the DACA rescis-
sion under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chief Justice Roberts 
turned to the important task of deciding whether the Supreme Court 
could only consider the conclusory justifications for the rescission in 
the 2017 Duke Memorandum, or whether it could also consider the 
more detailed explanation in Acting Secretary Nielsen’s June 2018 
memorandum. In a key move, Roberts read administrative law doc-
trine as limiting DHS to reliance on Duke’s perfunctory explanation. 
The following subsections analyze Chief Justice Roberts’s approach 
to this complex issue and then discuss Justice Kavanaugh’s powerful 
dissent.
61  140 S. Ct. at 1909.
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1.  Chief Justice Roberts and the perils of agency post hoc 
rationalizations
Chief Justice Roberts stressed the need for government to “turn 
square corners in dealing with the American people.” A sound stew-
ard deliberates systematically, without “cutting corners.”62 In con-
trast, an agency failing to do its job deliberates in haste and rolls out 
shifting rationales to suit its short-term interests.
Administrative law enforces the virtue of consistency through the 
Chenery doctrine. That doctrine takes its name from a 1943 Supreme 
Court decision holding that a court should only consider an agency’s 
initial justification for a decision, not subsequent justifications that 
may help the agency in a lawsuit but do not candidly represent the 
agency’s original rationale. That holding promotes “clarity in . . . [the] 
exercise” of administrative judgment, the responses of the agency’s 
stakeholders, and review by courts.63
The Chenery doctrine’s virtues dovetail with the uniformity that 
the Framers praised in the federal government’s constitutional role 
in foreign affairs. In Arizona v. United States, the virtue of consistency 
inhered in the straightforward negotiating position of a single central 
government, as compared with the patchwork quilt of 50 different sets 
of state law enforcement officials. In the DACA case, the issue was con-
sistency over time; an agency should deliberate about a position clearly 
and carefully when it first announces that decision, instead of issuing 
“‘post hoc’ [after-the-fact] rationalizations” that confuse the agency’s 
audience.64 As Roberts put it, this relentless procession of “belated jus-
tifications” forces litigants and courts to “chase a moving target.”65 
The confusion that results clashes with the agency’s stewardship role.
Having established the virtue of consistency over time in agency 
explanations, Chief Justice Roberts then applied it to limit DHS to 
62  Id. (citing St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., 
dissenting)).
63  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). Justice Felix Frankfurter, who prized 
methodical decisionmaking by agencies, wrote the opinion of the Court in Chenery and 
an earlier decision that he cited in his Chenery opinion, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 
313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941). Cf. Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and 
Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 Duke L.J. 291, 367 (2003) (explaining 
Chenery doctrine).
64  140 S. Ct. at 1909 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 419 (1971)).
65  Id.
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the Duke Memorandum’s reasons for the DACA rescission. Roberts 
described the Duke Memorandum as the “natural starting point” for 
the Court’s consideration of DHS’s reasons.66 Duke had merely cited, 
“without elaboration,” Attorney General Sessions’s legal conclusion 
that DACA exceeded the power Congress had delegated to immigra-
tion officials under the INA.67 Focusing on the Duke Memorandum’s 
stark statement of reasons put DHS at a marked disadvantage in the 
case, since Duke had not offered a detailed consideration of DACA re-
cipients’ expectations that the program would continue. In contrast, 
the Nielsen Memorandum’s explanation offered a more thorough re-
sponse. However, Roberts’s devotion to consistency cast the Nielsen 
Memorandum’s additional detail as a flaw, not a virtue. Citing the im-
portance of consistency, Roberts determined that this more elaborate 
reasoning was “nowhere to be found” in the Duke Memorandum, 
and that therefore the Nielsen Memorandum relied on “impermis-
sible post hoc rationalizations” that the Court would not address.68
2. Justice Kavanaugh’s narrower reading of the Chenery doctrine
If the Chenery doctrine is about agency consistency, it is important 
that courts apply the doctrine in the same consistent vein. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s expansive view of Chenery is not the only way to read 
administrative law. For Justice Kavanaugh, Roberts’s approach mis-
read the doctrine’s teaching.
In his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh viewed the Nielsen Memoran-
dum’s fuller account of reasons behind the rescission as an entirely 
permissible “amplified articulation” of points the government had 
made previously.69 For Kavanaugh, Chenery excluded a different sub-
set of after-the-fact explanations: the arguments of lawyers in liti-
gation, who have an incentive to cobble together remotely plausible 
rationales to satisfy reviewing courts. The Nielsen Memorandum 
was not a lawyer’s tactic. As a mere amplification of earlier reason-
ing by a responsible official, the Nielsen Memorandum had all the 
consistency administrative law could reasonably require.
66  Id. at 1907.
67  Id. at 1910.
68  Id. at 1908–09.
69  140 S. Ct. at 1934 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Alpharma v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 
6 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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But Justice Kavanaugh’s more constrained view of the Chenery doc-
trine does not fully answer Chief Justice Roberts’s concerns.70 Con-
sistency in this case would have cost DHS little. DHS could have 
deliberated with greater depth in 2017, instead of issuing a more compre-
hensive explanation only after judicial prompting. Especially given the 
high stakes of the decision, it was reasonable for Chief Justice Roberts 
to expect a more detailed explanation of DHS’s reasons up front.
B. Regents and Reliance Interests
The equitable balancing dimension of stewardship took center 
stage for Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis of DACA recipients’ reli-
ance interests. As noted above, stewardship considers both the “bal-
ance of hardships” and the public interest. In finding that the Duke 
Memorandum had failed to assess the weight of recipients’ reliance, 
Roberts observed that maintaining stability for recipients also ben-
efited the public.
As a matter of administrative law doctrine, Roberts’s analysis of the 
Duke Memorandum’s deliberative flaws invoked that staple of robust 
judicial review, the “hard look” doctrine.71 Under the “hard look” 
doctrine, there must be a “satisfactory explanation” of the agency’s 
decision. Moreover, the agency must engage in “consideration of the 
relevant factors” and address each “important aspect of the problem” 
at hand.72 That commitment to “consideration” is a core tenet of eq-
uitable balancing and the duties of stewardship. Because her memo-
randum did not assess the weight that DHS should accord recipients’ 
reliance interests, Acting Secretary Duke failed this threshold test.
Roberts noted that the Duke Memorandum would have termi-
nated DACA recipients’ participation starting with current terms 
that ended on March 6, 2018, a mere six months after the rescission’s 
announcement, with all participation ending two years after that, 
on March 6, 2020. While at first blush this wind-down period might 
70  In the interest of full disclosure, I should explain that my own view has shifted 
on this point. In an earlier piece, I also took a narrow view of Chenery and the DACA 
rescission, although my discussion was limited to two sentences in a footnote. See 
Margulies, Rescinding Inclusion, supra note 7, at 1473 n.240.
71  140 S. Ct. 1912–13 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
72  Id. at 1905 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416); id. at 1913 (citing State Farm, 463 
U.S. at 43).
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seem reasonable, a closer look revealed that Duke had failed to ei-
ther accommodate the expectations of recipients or explain why such 
accommodation was inappropriate. Consider again the hypothetical 
posed earlier of a DACA recipient who enrolled in a four-year college 
in September 2016 and whose two-year DACA period of participation 
was due to end on March 6, 2018. In Chief Justice Roberts’s apt phrase, 
this recipient would be “caught in the middle of a time-bounded com-
mitment,” without either sufficient notice of the rescission to avoid em-
barking on an undergraduate degree or sufficient time to complete her 
college education.73 Chief Justice Roberts described a similar predica-
ment for persons serving in the armed forces or receiving an extended 
course of needed medical treatment. According to Roberts, Duke 
could have considered allowing our hypothetical college student and 
similar “caught in the middle” recipients to complete their respective 
periods of study, treatment, or service.74 A good steward would have 
at least deliberated about a wind-down that reflected these concerns.
The dashed expectations that Chief Justice Roberts flagged also 
affected a large number of U.S. nationals. In our college student hy-
pothetical, consider the interests of the U.S. school that had counted 
on the recipient’s continued enrollment and devoted substantial re-
sources to her education. Chief Justice Roberts suggested that those 
interests were also an aspect of the case that DHS should have con-
sidered.75 Roberts did not cite the Supreme Court’s decision almost 
40 years earlier in Plyler v. Doe. Nevertheless, his argument echoed 
the anxiety in Plyler and Arizona about negative externalities—
impacts on persons and entities beyond the parties. Echoing these 
risks, Roberts reminded readers that the adverse effects of the re-
scission would “radiate outward” from recipients to U.S. persons 
and institutions involved in recipients’ lives, including U.S. citizen 
children, schools where recipients “study and teach,” and employ-
ers who invested money and effort in preparing recipients to work 
in their companies and were now facing a loss of their investment.76
73  Id. at 1914.
74  Id.
75  Id. (quoting the rescission’s challengers and their amici as asserting that there was 
“much for DHS to consider,” including the expectations of third parties with ties to 
DACA recipients).
76  Id. (citing Brief for Respondent Regents of Univ. of Cal. et al. at 41–42, Dep’t of 
Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587)).
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As a sound steward, DHS had to deliberate about the relative merits 
of rescission versus the synergy that rescission would extinguish be-
tween DACA and the public interest. Beyond deliberation, Robert dis-
claimed any duty by DHS to continue the program. Upon deliberation, 
DHS might have concluded that recipients’ reliance interests were not 
weighty in the scheme of things or did not outweigh legal questions 
about the program. But the Duke Memorandum suffered from a de-
liberative deficit. Invoking the responsibilities of stewardship, Roberts 
asserted that deliberation about reliance interests was a central part of 
“the agency’s job” and “responsibility” that the agency had neglected.77
C.  Stewardship’s Puzzle: The Practical Problems with Separation of 
Forbearance and Benefits
In the course of discussing DHS’s failure to consider recipients’ re-
liance interests, Chief Justice Roberts also separated out two aspects 
of DACA: its reprieve from deportation, which Roberts called “for-
bearance,” and its provision of eligibility for a work permit, which 
Roberts referred to as DACA’s “benefits” prong.78 Roberts asserted 
that Acting Secretary Duke erred by failing to consider the legality 
of continuing forbearance under DACA, while terminating benefits. 
Roberts’s separation of these two parts of DACA reinforced his point 
that DHS failed to consider reliance interests. But Roberts’s separa-
tion of DACA into forbearance and benefits was artificial, since in 
practice the two parts are often integrally related.
Roberts clearly viewed as “important” Acting Secretary Duke’s 
failure to separately consider the legality of benefits and forbearance, 
respectively.79 For Roberts, forbearance—detached from benefits—
was DACA’s “centerpiece.”80 According to Roberts, the bulk of the 
DHS memorandum announcing DACA was “devoted entirely” to 
77  Id.
78  Id. at 1911–13.
79  Id. at 1913 (citation omitted). Harvard Law professor Benjamin Eidelson was one 
of the architects of advocates’ strategy on this point. See Benjamin Eidelson, “Un-
bundling DACA and Unpacking Regents: What Chief Justice Roberts Got Right,” 
Balkinization (blog), June 25, 2020, https://bit.ly/3gwIQpX; see also Josh Blackman, 
“Where Did CJ Roberts’s Anti-Saving Construction in the DACA Case Come From?,” 
Reason: Volokh Conspiracy, June 20, 2020, https://bit.ly/2Pp4jVQ (discussing origins 
and development of separation idea in the course of litigation over the DACA rescission).
80  Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913.
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forbearance, with a single isolated sentence instructing DHS to con-
sider recipient requests for work permits.81 However, this view of 
DACA as centering on forbearance and conferring eligibility for ben-
efits as an afterthought failed to recognize benefits’ crucial role.
From the start, the ability to leverage recipients’ skills by provid-
ing work permits was integral to DACA’s plan. In announcing DACA, 
DHS Secretary Napolitano cited the “productive young people” that 
the program would help, further noting that “many” prospective 
recipients had “already contributed to our country in significant 
ways.”82 These observations were hardly throwaway lines. Build-
ing on her description of prospective recipients’ valuable contribu-
tions to U.S. society, Napolitano directed DHS to accept applications 
for work permits from DACA recipients. Picking up on this signal, 
contemporary media accounts and immigration advocates touted 
DACA’s benefits.83 A policy of forbearance without benefits would 
not have earned that level of enthusiasm.84
That said, separating forbearance from benefits is not entirely arti-
ficial. Consider recipients that Roberts mentioned who are enrolled 
in college or receiving medical treatment. A state such as California 
allows noncitizens to enroll in higher education programs and pay 
in-state tuition even if they are not lawfully present.85 Some hospitals 
will provide medical treatment under similar circumstances. For at 
least the California cohort of recipients, forbearance alone will serve 
81  Id. at 1912 n.6.
82  See Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 4, at 2.
83  See Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., “Obama to Permit Young Migrants to 
Remain in U.S.,” N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at A1 (citing eligibility for work permits in 
lead paragraph, mentioning eligibility throughout story, and quoting “[i]mmigrant 
student leaders as expecting that the ‘majority of [immigrant] students would seize 
the opportunity to work and come out of the shadows’”).
84  On the practical problems with separating benefits and forbearance, the proof is in the 
pudding. DHS’s practice under President Obama’s second Senate-confirmed Homeland 
Security Secretary, Jeh Johnson, virtually always resulted in work authorization for suc-
cessful DACA applicants. See Jie Zong et al., Migration Pol’y Inst., A Profile of DACA Re-
cipients by Education, Industry, and Occupation 3–8 (Nov. 2017), https://bit.ly/30yWhjD 
(describing details of DACA recipients’ work permit status based on DHS statistics, and 
implying that virtually all recipients who sought a work permit received one).
85  Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 861 (Cal. 2010) (citing Cal. 
Educ. Code § 68130.5(a)(4)); see also Ming Hsu Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legiti-
macy of Executive Action in Immigration Law, 66 Syracuse L. Rev. 87, 129–30 (2016) 
(describing state laws and policies).
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reliance interests. To that extent, Roberts’s point that DHS should 
have considered splitting up benefits and forbearance fits the model 
of deliberative stewardship.86
Viewing DHS’s duty as deliberative stewardship connects Regents 
with earlier precedents such as Plyler v. Doe and Arizona v. United States 
and historical examples such as President Pierce’s intervention in the 
Martin Koszta episode. Regents also echoes the 2019 census decision, 
Department of Commerce v. New York. In Department of Commerce, as noted 
above, Chief Justice Roberts noted the high stakes of adding a citizen-
ship question on the census and required a clear and consistent justifica-
tion. The Commerce Department’s “contrived” justification on needing 
data for Voting Rights Act compliance failed to pass muster.87 Admit-
tedly, Roberts did not refer to Acting Secretary Duke’s explanation for 
the DACA rescission as pretextual, in the way that he had characterized 
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s reasons in the census case. Nev-
ertheless, each decision focused on flawed and shifting explanations 
for momentous actions that departed from established practice. In both 
decisions, Roberts seems to be reminding agencies that stewardship re-
quires sounder deliberation than the agencies saw fit to provide.
D. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
On the substance of the DACA rescission, Justice Thomas’s dissent 
stressed the structural concerns raised by the Fifth Circuit about 
the DAPA program. In interpreting statutes, courts generally hold 
that Congress does its work mindfully, drafting language to cover 
issues it considers crucial and specifically describing areas where 
it has delegated discretion to an agency such as DHS. When courts 
read Congress’s silence as giving vast power to an agency, the courts 
risk making the text of the law “wholly superfluous.”88 Treating the 
86 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the claim of the rescission’s challengers that the 
rescission violated the Equal Protection Clause. 140 S. Ct. at 1915–16. Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor dissented from this part of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. Id. at 1916–18 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part).
87 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019).
88 Id. at 1925 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also stated that if the statute 
permitted a vast program like DACA to be created under executive fiat, the INA 
would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 1929 n.13. Cf. Gary 
Lawson, “I’m Leavin’ It (All) Up to You”: Gundy and the (Sort-of) Resurrection of 
the Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018–2019 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 31 (2019) (discussing recent 
indications that the Supreme Court is ready to revive the nondelegation doctrine).
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actual words of the statute as a useless ornament that the executive 
branch can sweep aside would make Congress a supporting player 
in the legislative arena, when Congress should have the lead role.
Applying these principles, Justice Thomas asserted that DACA, like 
DAPA, was far too large a program to fit within the INA’s specific 
framework. Congress’s careful drafting would have been a waste of 
time if DHS could establish a program of DACA’s size “at the stroke of 
a Cabinet secretary’s pen.”89 By invalidating an effort by a subsequent 
administration to end this clash with the INA’s framework, the Court’s 
majority had disregarded a crucial tenet of statutory interpretation.
Furthermore, Thomas reminded the majority that regard for the 
reliance interests of DACA recipients did not fit past practice on 
deferred action, which Justice Scalia in an earlier decision had de-
scribed as rooted in administrative “convenience.”90 Indeed, when 
it announced DACA during the Obama administration, DHS had 
stated that it could “terminate . . . deferred action at any time at the 
agency’s discretion.”91 Thomas warned that while deferred action’s 
ease of implementation had been a virtue, the majority’s decision 
would henceforth make future officials hesitate to grant it, since re-
scinding such grants will in the future entail “years of litigation.”92
While Thomas’s critique of the majority’s position is cogent, ul-
timately Roberts’s focus on DACA recipients’ reliance interest is 
more convincing from a stewardship perspective. Thomas’s dissent 
insightfully outlined the structural argument against DACA. But 
Roberts’s focus on DHS’s deliberative deficit sidestepped this point. 
Stewardship’s equitable balancing strand helps support Roberts’s 
analysis. As mentioned above, under longstanding equitable prin-
ciples that govern how a court devises a remedy for a particular il-
legal act, the court must consider a range of factors, including the 
balance of hardships and the public interest.93 That may mean that a 
court will not order an immediate end to a practice, but will instead 
89  140 S. Ct. at 1925–26 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90  Id. at 1931 n.16 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 
525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999)).
91  Id. (citation omitted).
92  Id.; cf. Ilya Shapiro, “DACA Ruling: Bad Judging on Top of Bad Lawyering, Good 
for Dreamers but Makes Immigration Reform Harder,” Cato at Liberty (blog), June 18, 
2020, https://bit.ly/2XwReho.
93  See Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329.
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order a gradual termination. While a court has discretion to craft a 
remedy that includes a wind-down or opt for immediate termination 
of the challenged practice, the court will have to show that it bal-
anced all the necessary factors in reaching its result.94 This is exactly 
what DHS failed to do in rescinding DACA. That failure of due de-
liberation about remedy was problematic, regardless of DACA’s legal 
merits. In this sense, Roberts’s approach fit the stewardship model 
and deflected much of Thomas’s critique.
Conclusion
Like the Court’s 2019 census decision, Department of Commerce, 
in which Chief Justice Roberts also authored the majority opinion, 
Regents imposes a higher than usual burden of justification on ex-
ecutive branch officials. In the census case, the Court found the De-
partment of Commerce’s “voting rights enforcement” rationale for a 
census citizenship question to be pretextual. It did so even though 
that finding involved looking behind the Commerce Department’s 
stated justifications, into its “contrived” interactions with a Justice 
Department that—truth to tell—seemed largely uninterested in the 
Commerce Department’s ostensible voting rights rationale. Regents 
did not find that DHS’s reasons for rescinding DACA were pretex-
tual. But Chief Justice Roberts still looked beyond the structural 
issue of DACA’s fit with the INA and found the agency’s deliberative 
process flawed, especially in its failure to consider DACA recipients’ 
reliance interests and alternatives to the outright termination by 
March 2020 that DHS had announced.
Although Chief Justice Roberts did not mention stewardship per 
se in his opinion, his analysis of DHS’s “job” and “responsibility” 
in deliberating about reliance interests and alternatives to outright 
rescission sounded in that key. Starting with the cautionary tale of 
stewardship’s absence in the Jonathan Robbins episode during the 
John Adams administration, executive practice has contemplated a 
gap-filling role in protecting prospective Americans against nonfed-
eral sovereigns. The stewardship suggested by this interstitial role 
has highlighted the virtues of consistency and equitable balancing, 
94  See N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969–72 (2d Cir. 
1983). In this decision, Judge Henry Friendly discussed the role of factors such as the 
public interest and effects on persons or entities not before the court in modification of 
an equitable decree reforming a government institution.
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especially synergies between the welfare of prospective Americans 
and the public interest. Cases like Plyler v. Doe and Arizona v. United 
States illustrate these virtues in restraining individual states’ efforts 
at immigration enforcement when that enforcement might affect 
the national interest and U.S. foreign relations. Department of Com-
merce touched on similar virtues, particularly in its skeptical look 
at the Commerce Department’s stated rationale for departing from 
decades of practice omitting a citizenship question from the census.
In Regents, the dissenters made cogent arguments that the major-
ity’s review lacked a clear basis in either administrative law doctrine 
or the statutory scheme. Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent pointed out that 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, which limited DHS to reliance on the 
stark Duke Memorandum and barred any consideration of the later, 
more detailed Nielsen Memorandum, rested on an expansive read-
ing of the Chenery doctrine. Excluding the Nielsen Memorandum 
may not serve Chenery’s premises, which center on the need to limit 
agency lawyers’ litigation-driven rationales.
Justice Thomas’s dissent argued to great effect that Chief Justice 
Roberts failed to fully address the large DACA program’s poor fit with 
the INA’s carefully crafted framework of enumerated categories of for-
eign nationals who can enter or legally remain in the United States and 
its residual category of persons subject to removal. That structural con-
cern drove the courts’ halt of the Obama administration’s even larger 
DAPA program. The role of similar structural concerns on DACA raises 
difficult questions that Roberts did not try to definitively answer.
Nevertheless, the stewardship model supports Chief Justice 
Roberts’s focus on the deliberative virtues of consistency, consider-
ation of synergies between DACA recipients’ expectations and the 
public interest, and assessment of alternatives. Acting Secretary 
Duke would have lost little by a fuller explanation of reasons in 
September 2017, when DHS first announced the DACA rescission. 
Moreover, analogy to the law of equitable remedies shows that DHS 
could have deliberated with greater care about resolving tensions 
between DACA and the statutory scheme.
Taking care of the laws of the United States is a key part of the ex-
ecutive branch’s constitutional responsibility. The DACA rescission 
affected the implementation of the INA and the interests of millions 
of U.S. citizens, LPRs, domiciliaries, and organizations. A duty of 
deliberative stewardship in a matter with such high stakes is a rea-
sonable requirement to impose on a responsible agency.
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